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SOME LESSONS FOR NONPROFITS
By Jeffrey Haas
W hile most individualinvestors have been busilylicking their portfolio
wounds the last two years, another
group of nervous investors has gone
largely unnoticed until now. As report-
ed late last year in the New York Times
(Nov 5, 2002), this group is com-
prised of directors and trustees of col
leges, universities, hospitals and other
charitable institutions.
Like their retail investor counter-
parts, many of these directors and
trustees have watched in dismay as
their endowment funds have declined
over the past two years. With respect
to college endowments, for example,
two out of every three fell in value (ur-
ing fiscal year 2001, with the average
decline pegged at 3.6 percent. The
numbers for fiscal year 2002 appear
worse, with preliminary data showing
an average decline of 5.Af percent.
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These declines may not elicit sym-
pathy from investors negatively affect-
ed by the implosions of Enron, World
Coni. Tyco and certain other high
fliers of the late 1990s. Nevertheless,
given the conservative veneer of most
e ndownictits, these declines are, it
fact, highly significant - especially
when examined historically.
Indeed, the fiscal year 2001 decline
in college endowments was the first
since 1984, and one must look back
to the early 1970s for the last time
they lost value two consecutive years.
All in all, billions of endowment dol-
lars have been lost, most probably for
good.
The timing of these declines, more-
over, could not have been worse. With
weahhy donors dramat ically scaling
back their charitable giving in
response to falling stock prices and a
weakened economy, capital campaigns
and other fund-raising activities are
unlikely to make up the shortfalls.
This is truly unfortunate because
niany nunprofits withdraw funds from
their endownenis each year to supple-
ment their operating budgets. For
example, many college entdownnts
average their endowinent values for
the last three years and then take a
percentage (often around 5 percent) of
that value for use in normal business
operaitons. As a result, many nonprof-
its are facing an actual loss in the con-
tribution to their operating funds fat
the first time in a generation. Those
depending on nonprofits - stu-
dents, alunii, patients, doctors and
comutlities generally - likewise
will suffer.
I lad a level investment playing
field existed over the last lC.w, years,
nonprofit directors and trustees sim-
ply could shrug off the declines and
move forvard. This, however, was not
the case. Sonic public compaies
cooked their books, misstating their
true financial positions and misleading
investors - including endownent
funds - in the process. Additionally
some of Wall Street's leading financial
institutions apparently used a flawed
business model ihat placed their own
desire for outsi7ed profits ahead of
clients' needs.
In light ol recent events, it
behooves nonprofit directors and
trustees to conduct a soup-to-nuts
review of their endowments' invest-
ment policies and the impletentation
of those policies over the last few
years. Were investments overly con
cetratedl in violation of those poli-
cies? Were investiniets made in corn-
panies tainted by accounting fraud
that were ultimately sold at a loss?
\Vere investment decisions made
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based on deceptive investment advice?
To the extent the review reveals
fraudulent misconduct, directors and
trustees should consider pursuing
available legal avenues to recover loss-
es rather than simply shrugging their
shoulders and wringing their hands.
[his advice is no doubt alien to
niany of those operating within the
gentlenanly and lady-like world o1
nonprofits. Because confrontation is
often distasteful and, in the context of
a nonprofit, virtually unexpected, it is
worth asking the following important
question: Does the law require non-
priffit direetors and irustees to cotn-
duct a full endowment review based
on recent events? While the simple
answer to this question is yes, there is
more to the story.
As is the case for directors of for-
profit cotrporatiots, state not-for-profit
trustee from delegating authority over
investments. Moreover, a trustee's stan-
dard of care was based on concepts of
ordinary or simple negligence, rather
than gross negligence.
Fortunately, the law no longer
holds a nonprolit director or trustee to
such exacting standards. Instead, a
nonprofit directors conduct is gov-
erned by standards applicable to for-
profit directors. Thus, the fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty apply as
equally to notprofit. directors as they
do to for-profit directors. Moreover,
most states provide nonprofit directors
atid trustees the presumptive protec-
tion of the business judgment rule.
Thus, those suing nonprofit directors
or trustees will have to proffer evi-
dence overcoming the presump ion
that the directors or trustees have, in
fact, acted in good faith and with due
Yes, confrontation is distasteful.
corporate law recognizes that the buck
stops with nonprofit directors and
trustees. Because matny view thetit-
selves as having been recruited for
their ability to raise or contribute
funds rather than for their managerial
lrvess. Ihis could come as a surprise.
Notprofit directors and trustees,
hovevet; simply do not operate in an
"advisory" role, leaving the tough deci-
sions to senior officers. Indeed,
according to Professor I larvey Gold-
schinid (now SEC Commissioner
Goldschniid) of Columbia L.aw School,
many have "false comfort" in that they
assume that a little governance activi-
ty and a lot of fund raisitg will suffice"
in satisfying their legal obligations.
listorically a nonprofit director's
conduct was measured by the exacting
standards applicable to a trustee of a
trust. Those standards prevented a
trustee from engaging in a self-dealing
transaction, whether or not Ibeneficial
to the trust. They also prevented a
care and with the best interests of the
nonprofit in mind.
With tespect to the duty of care.
the nonprofit standard of most states
parrots their for-profit analog. In New
York, for example, nonprofit "[direc-
tors and officers tiustl discharge the
duties of their respective positions in
good faith and with that degree of dili-
gence, care and skill which ordinarily
prident 1personsi would exercise
under similar circumstances in like
positions."
The "prudent person" is designed
to be a generalist with the ahility to
select and evaluate senior officers,
oversee and evaluate corporate pet-
formance, review and approve major
corporate plans and actions, and per-
form other functions normally per-
formed by for-profit directors. The
terms "similar circumstances" and "like
position" are designed to take into
account the nature, size and complexi-
ty of the nonprofit, the magnitude of
its problems, and the individual role of
a director when ascertaining whether
that director has salisfied his or her
duty of care.
Have the actions of nonprofit direc-
tors and trustees generally lived up to
this standard of care? At least one com-
mentator believes that, in many
instances, Ihe answer is no. According
to Mr. Goldschmid, the duty of care is
designed to encourage "accountability
and activily, far more activily than is
generally seen in nonprofit board
looms."
In the context of investment deci-
sions, most states have adopted the
Uniloi m Management of Institutional
Funds Act (UMIFA). Under Section 5,
the board of an eleemosynary institu-
tiotl may delegate day-to-day invest-
ment management authority to com-
mittees or employees. It also may
purchase investment advisory or man-
ageimient services.
When directors delegate invest-
ment management duties, Section 6 of
UMIFA requires directors to consider
the long anti short term needs of the
corporation in carrying out its purpose,
its present and anticipated financial
requirements, expected total return on
its investments, price level trends, and
general economic conditions.
Despite statutory authority to dele-
gate investment management duties,
responsibility for investment policy
and selection of competent agents
remains firmly with the board. A
board simply cannot delegate invest-
ment authority and then turn a blind
eye to the investment performance of
its endowment fund. A directors geni-
eral duty to protect the nonprofit from
actual or perceived harm, including
harm caused by those to whom invest-
ment authority has been granted legit-
imately. prohibits this.
Indeed, William joseplisoit, New
York's assistant altorney general in
charge of the Charities Bureau, recently
wrote that "[tihe duty of care requires
that i rttstees, directors and officers...
be attentive to the organization's activi-
ties and finances and actively oversee
the way in which its assets are man-
MaviJne2003
aged.... This includes .. ensuring
that funds arc propcrly managed, ask-
ing questions, and exercising sound
judgment."
As Mr..josephson's statement makes
clear, the duty of care requires boards
to make reasonable inquiries whenever
ciicumstances warrant. Given the
seemingly never-ending news reports
of accounting mismanagenment at
many public companies, the boundless
conflicts of interest affecting stock-ana-
lyst research and the other mnisdeeds
occurring on Wall Street, has there
ever been a larger red flag waving
hefore the eyes of nonprofit directors
and trustees? At a minim'tm, those
whose endowments have declined
must determine whether the declines
occurred unnecessarily as a result of
others' misdeeds.
Boards, of course, are legally enti-
tled to rely on information, opinions,
reports and statements prepared by
officers, counsel, public accountants,
other advisers and hoard corn mil tees.
Such reliance, however, must be in
good faith. If a director or trustee has
knowledge of a problem affecting the
investment management or portfolio
securities of his or her endowment,
that director or trustee should con-
duct a thorough investigation to see if
the endowment's performance has
been harmed.
If directors or trustees uncover
malfeasance as part of their inquiry,
they should consitler pursuing avail-
able legal avenues to recover losses. If,
for example, investments were overly
concentrated, directors and trustees
should consider legal action against
the investment adviser, While certain-
ly[ not anl insurer of its client's invest-
ments, an investment adviser whose
investments were negligently and
improperly made at the outset could
face liability
Directors and trustees also could
sue the companies in which their
endowments invested. The University
of California public university system
lost $145 million by investing in
Enron. Breaking with tradition,
trustees took the fight to those it
blamed for this staggering loss. The
system has become the lead plaintiff
in a 500-page lawsuit that names
Enron', directors and senior officers,
its public atditors, nine banks and
two law firms with fraud,
Will nonprofit directors or trustees
incur personal liability for sitting on
their hands when the law requires
action? Theoretically, the answer is yes
- but practically speaking, the
answer is no in most instances, This
conclusion stems fiom art analysis of
both the business judgment rule and
statutory provisions regarding stand-
ing to sue.
Nonprofit directors ani trustees
enjoy the presumptive protection of
the business judgment rule in most
states. This protection is particularly
important in the context of a nonprof-
it corporation because many not-for-
profit corporate codes do not allow
nonprofit corporations to adopt
exculpatory charter provisions.
Overcoming the presumption that
directors or trustees acted in good
faith, with due care and with the best
interests of the nonprofit in mind is
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an uphill battle for anyone with stand-
ing to Ftue. This is especially true in
states that employ a gross negligence
standard of care
In the context of the duty or loyahy
however, the business judgment rule is
disabled whenever a plaintfif proffers
evidence of directorial self-interest. In
Schetier Family Fotidation Inc. it 61
Associatcs ( 582 N.Y.S.2d 662 (NY.
App. Div. 1992)), for example, a for-
mer director of the foundation sued
the remaining directors claiming they
negligently selected, supervised and
monitored the foundation- investment
adviser. The defendants filed a mot ion
to dismiss based on the business judg-
ment rule, but the court refused to
grant it hecause one or more directors
also worked at, or had personal invest-
ments in, that investment adviser.
In terms of standing to sue, non-
profits have no shareholders to bring
traditional derivative lawsuits. Never-
theless, il, not-for-profit law of moost
states points to three potential plain-
ti[Is in a suit against nonprolit directors
or trustees.
The first is another nonprofit direc-
ior, trustee or ollcer siting lerivatively
on behalf or the nonprofit. Such suits,
however, are unlikely to occur unless
what is being alleged is directorial dis-
loyalty or self-dealing.
The second potential plaintilf is one
or more members of a membership
nonprofit suing derivatively on behalf
of the nonprofit. Such a plaintiff has
the potential to becon'c a potleni fiorce
for ensuring directorial adherence to
fiduciary standards, but only in the
context of nilnibership nonprofits ard
not others.
The third and most likely potential
plaintill is a states attorney general.
The attorney general has the panrem
patriae power to protect the interest of
the public with tespect to assets
pledged to public: purposes, as well as
the statutory autthority to commence
investigations into and legal actions
against nonprofit directors and trustees.
Specifically. a stares attorney general
'I didn't linw Iupperly was in line for a golden paraithte!'
Bov"?M
catl sue directors and oflicers for breach
of fiduciary duties, including misman-
agernent and waste of corporate assets.
Indeed, Mr. Josephson views the New
York attorney general "as the enforcer of
the duties of care, loyalty and obedi-
ence." In this context, the attorney geil-
eral would be representing the interests
of the state in seeing nonprofits succeed.
History indicates, however, that it is
unlikely for any of these potential plain-
tiffs to sue nonprofit directors or
trustees for failing to investigatc the
decline in their organization's endow-
ment. Mr. Goldschmid attributes a lack
of litigation in the nonprofit area gener-
ally to the forbearance by state charity
regulators due to understaffing.
A puzzlingly paradox, therefore, per-
neates the nonprofit world. As
explained by Mr. Goldschmid, "non-
profit directors and officers generally
operate under the satne state [iduciary
standards as their for-profit peers, but,
in contrast to the for-profit world, fidu-
ciry duty law plays little iole in assur-
ing accountability in the nonprofit sec-
tor .... Highly restrictive standing riles
and a lack of governmental enforcement
have made the duty of care and duty of
loyalty standards almost wholly aspira-
tional in the nonprofit sector."
This all leads to two conclusions.
First, directors and tnstees of non-
profits have a legal duty to investigate
the decline in their endowtnent funds
given the unprecedented events in the
capital markets. Second, this duty is
unlikely to be enforced against them if
they fail to (ho so.
Btt simply because that dty is
unlikely to be enforced does not under-
mtine its existence. The policy behind
the duty is sound given how important
endowments are to the survival of
Inlny 10InoproitS.
Directors and trustees, therefore,
need to recognize their moral obliga-
tion to protect the organizations the)
serve regardless or whether their legal
duty to do so is enforced- Nonprofits
simply are too vital to their con-
stituencies and the communities in
which they operate for their directors





NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FEDERAL COMMUNITY DEFENI)ERS, INC.
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA FEDERAL COMMUNITY DEFENDERS, INC., a non-profit
pri vate corporation funded by tile Administrative Office ofthc U.S. Courts, is accepting applications
for the position of assistant federal defender to be stationed in the Hammond office. The federal
defender organization operates under authority of the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, to
provide defense services to individuals charged with fedcral criminal cases and related matters, who
are financially unable to retain counsel.
Requirements. An assistant federal defender must be: (1) a graduate of an accredited law
school, and admitted to practice in good standing before the highest court of a state; (2) licensed to
practice in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana; and (3) licensed to practice
law in a state bar. The applicant must be willing to become licensed in the State of Indiana within
one year of the appointment. Appointment may be subject to a satisfactory background
investigation.
Duties. The assistant federal defender will represent clients charged with federal criminal
offenses, including trial, appellate and ancillary matters. The position requires considerable travel
for investigation, litigation, and training. Assistant flederal defender may not engage in the private
practice of law.
Selection Criteria. Tile successful applicant will have an established capacity or clearly
demonstrated aptitude for excellence in criminal defense practice, a commitment to the
representation of indigent accused persons, and a reputation for personal integrity. Experience in
handling federal criminal cases and trial experience are preferred.
Salary. The salary ofan assistant federal defender is commensurate with that of an assistant
U.S. attorney with similar qualifications and experience.
How to Apply. Qualified persons may apply by forwarding a letter of interest, r6suml, and
representative writing sample marked "Confidential" to: Personnel Officer, Northern District of
Indiana Federal Conmmiunity Defenders, Inc., P.O. Box 667, Hammond, Indiana 46325-0667. No
phone calls please. Position announced March 17, 2003; applications accepted until May 17, 2003.
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